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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation,
LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING,
TED R. BROWN and WARREN B.
BROWN, Trustee,
Appellants,

Case No. 87-0011

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

What is the status of plaintiffs1 evidence on

appeal from a Motion to Dismiss granted at the close of plaintiffs'
evidence?
II.

Does a property owner have an established right

of access to parking spaces shown on the building plans and
used constantly following construction of the building many
years ago?
III.

Will action in inverse condemnation lie where

there is substantial loss of access but no physical appropriation?
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IV.

Will an action lie against Salt Lake City where

there is substantial loss of access but no physical appropriation,
following demand on Salt Lake City which was denied?
V.

Is there denial of reasonable access where parking

spaces accessible from the street are made inaccessible directly?
VI.

Should the Court rule that a physical taking

is an essential element of recovery where the City attempts
to do in two separate proceedings what it started out to do
in a single proceeding?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This action was tried on an Amended Complaint stating
two (2) causes of action:

First, in inverse condemnation against

Salt Lake City for depriving appellants of their access to parking
spaces in front of their buildings resulting from widening of
the street and construction of a vertical curb; and secondly,
an action for damages against Salt Lake City for loss of use
of appellants1 parking spaces where no land was physically taken.
Proceedings Below
The original Complaint was for inverse condemnation
only

(Tr. 2-6) and following the receipt of defendant's First

Memorandum

(Tr. 14-19), a demand was made upon Salt Lake City

to recognize the governmental immunity question
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss

(Tr. 27-29).

(Tr. 30-32 and 59-61),
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an Amended Complaint was filed (Tr. 13-19),

including an action

against Salt Lake City under the municipal claims statute on
the possibility that inverse condemnation would not lie because
it might be held that there was no physical taking (Tr. 77) .
Upon the trial of the case, plaintiffs/appellants offered their
evidence and rested.

A Motion to Dismiss was argued and granted

by the Court (Tr. 114). Proposed Findings of Fact were submitted
by the respondent (Tr. 142-145) , objected to by appellants (Tr. 131135) , and argued to the Court.

Some of the objections were

ruled as well taken and were included in the ultimate Findings
of Fact

(Tr. 126-130).

A Motion for New Trial and to Amend

the Judgment further was filed and briefed in the Third District
Court (Tr. 151-173) on April 28, 1986.

No answering memorandum

was filed and on August 8, appellants filed a Request for Ruling
on the Motion for New Trial and submitted additional authorities
to the Court

(Tr. 174-218).

The Court denied the Motion for

New Trial on October 29 (Tr. 219) and because respondent did
not submit an Order, the appellants finally submitted an Order
Denying Motion for New Trial, which the Court signed December
3, 1986

(Tr. 220).

The Notice of Appeal was filed December

29, 1986 (Tr. 222).
Statement of Facts
At the close of plaintiffs1 evidence, the motion of
defendant to dismiss the action was granted

(Tr. 114).

The
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Court accepted some of the appellants1 proposed additional Findings
and rejected others, making nine (9) Findings of Fact as follows:
1. Three-D Corporation is the owner of real
property located at 238 West 1300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah,
2. Warren B. Brown, Trustee, and Ted R. Brown
are now the owners of real property located at
234 West 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, which
property is under lease to Distributors Inc. Colorado
and Distributors Inc. Utah.
3.
On June 1, 1983, defendant commenced
the construction of a Special Improvement District
which provided for the installation of curb and
gutter and the widening of the roadway of 1300
South Street.
4. In order to widen the boundaries of 1300
South Street between 200 and 300 West Streets
in Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendant attempted
to purchase a portion of plaintiffs1 property
which fronted on said street.
5. The plaintiffs refused to sell any portion
of their frontage property for the street widening
project unless they were paid for damage to their
property from loss of parking spaces. As a result,
the City extended the roadway, widening only
to the existing boundaries of 1300 South Street
and no portion of the roadway or curb was constructed
upon property owned by the [plaintiffs] . Two
curb cuts were made allowing plaintiffs continued
access to their property.
6 . The building of each plaintiff was constructed
with offices and areas for serving drop-in customers
with sales and services, which buildings were
so used from 1956 as to the Three D building
and from 1957 as to the Distributors Inc. building.
7. The placing of the curb at the property
lines of the plaintiffs has prevented plaintiffs
and their customers from driving from 1300 South
Street directly into each of their angle parking
spaces.
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8, Lorin Miller is the Lessee of Three D
Corporation and claims damage to his leasehold
interest because of the loss of parking involved
in this action,
9.
Said roadway widening eliminated the
continued use of plaintiffs1 property as a parking
area adjacent to the front of plaintiffs1 properties.
However, two curb cuts were constructed so as
to provide access to the subject properties [from]
the roadway. (Tr. 126-130)
The appellants had proposed additional Findings in
the belief that they were supported by the evidence and should,
therefore, be found by the Court in the expectation that sending
up the transcript of testimony could be averted.
A summary of the Findings as made and of the proposed
Findings which were rejected may be useful to the Court in focusing
on the factual issues.
The Findings as made (Tr. 126-130) are recited above.
In summary, these Findings are:
Finding of Fact 1. Three D Corporation is
the owner of 238 West 1300 South.
Finding of Fact 2. Warren Brown as Trustee
and Ted Brown are owners of 234 West 1300 South,
which is under lease to Distributors Inc.
Finding of Fact 3. Salt Lake City commenced
construction of the Improvement District June
1, 1983.
Finding of Fact 4. Defendant attempted to
purchase a strip of property from the appellants.
Finding of Fact 5. Plaintiffs refused to
sell unless they were paid for loss of parking
and the City, therefore, widened only to the
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boundaries of the street, allowing two curb cuts
for continued access.
Finding of Fact 6. Buildings were constructed
by the plaintiffs to serve drop-in customers
and were so used from 1956 and 1957 respectively.
Finding of Fact 7. Curbs as built prevent
plaintiffs and their customers from driving directly
into the angle parking places in front of the
buildings.
Finding of Fact 8. Lorin Miller is lessee
from Three D Corporation.
Finding of Fact 9. Said widening of the
street eliminated continued use of plaintiffs1
property "as a parking area adjacent to the front
of plaintiffs1 properties" but the two curb cuts
provided access.
The additional Findings proposed by appellants and
rejected were numbered 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 (Tr. 136-141)
and were briefly as follows:
(6) Building permits were issued to appellants
in 1956 and 1957 based upon applications with
plot plans showing six parking spaces in front
of the Three D building and seven parking spaces
in front of the Distributors Inc. building.
(9) The curb cuts as placed permit driving
on to the area where there was previously a total
of thirteen parking places, but this greatly
reduces the number of usable parking places.
(10)
With the curb cuts as placed, a car
driving on to the Three D parking area cannot
go forward but must back out and on the Brown
property, the vehicle must go forward or else
back on to property beyond the property of that
appellant.
(11) None of the routes of access to parking
places as previously used is now available.
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(12) The loss of parking spaces has damaged
the businesses on the premises and has reduced
the value of the properties to a substantial
extent.
(13) The curb cuts placed for appellants1
properties have a 3h or 4-inch vertical face,
whereas curb cuts on all the other properties
in the improvement district have a rounded face
of approximately 1-inch in height, making use
of the curb cuts in appellants1 property unpleasant
and difficult.
(14)
Because of the unfinished condition
left in front of appellants1 properties, water
now accumulates on appellants1 properties without
adequate drainage.
The reason appellants ask this Court to review the
evidence in the light of these requested additional Findings
is for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the Court
the specific facts and the nature and extent of the damage claimed
by appellants, because the Court in its Conclusions of Law No. 2
held that the restriction of access was not "so unreasonably
as to make it a taking"; and in Conclusion 3, "Although plaintiffs
suffered considerable damage ...", it wasn't enough; and in
Conclusions 5 and 6 that because the City didn't go beyond the
property line and failed to show a taking, there can be no recovery
(Tr. 129).

It is, of course, the position of the appellants

that the closing of access to the parking areas, the restriction
of use of the areas in front of the buildings, and the damages
suffered by the appellants were so considerable and so great
that this Court should hold that there was a taking and that
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in any event, there was compensable damage.
The evidence supporting these rejected Findings of
Fact is in part as follows:
Requested Finding No, 6 (Tr, 138)
6. Building permits were issued by Salt Lake
City in 1956 as to Three D Corporation and in 1957
as to what is now the Brown property based upon applications with plot plans attached showing parking at
the south end of the buildings on the owners1 property
accessible from the street, six (6) parking spaces
in front of the Three D building and seven (7) parking
spaces in front of the Distributors Inc. building,
as shown on some of the exhibits.
This requested Finding requests two findings:

(a)

that building permits were issued for each of the buildings
involved, and

(b) that the applications for building permits

showed parking places in front of the buildings.
(a)

John DeYoung at pages 261, 262 and 264 of the

Transcript, stated that building permits were obtained for each
of the buildings, although he no longer has the plans submitted.
Ted Brown testified:
I know the building
issued. (Tr. 373)

permit was

Exhibit P-l shows the building permits issued 3/14/55
for 238 West 1300 South and 11/19/56 for 234 West 1300 South.
See also Exhibit D-31.

There can be no doubt that a building

permit was issued for each of the buildings.
(b)
parking.

The applications included plans showing front
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A Subpoena to the Archivist for City records brought
Val Wilson before the Court, but he testified that the files
for this period of the building inspector's department were
not available (Tr. 260) .
Exhibit D-28 includes Chapter 8 of Zoning, which provides
in § 51-8-1 that off-street parking must be provided when any
building or structure is erected, with adequate provisions for
ingress or egress by standard-sized automobiles.
of parking required is set forth in § 51-8-3.

The amount

It, therefore,

appears that the application for building permits must have
shown where the off-street parking was to be and that it was
sufficient in quantity.
Mr. DeYoung testified that the plans on which the
permit was issued have "long since gone down the drain."

The

buildings were set back from the street "so they could have
trucks or cars park in front, pull up and go in the building"
(Tr. 262) .

Ted Brown testified that the plans submitted showed

the parking, and they were drawn on the plans with dividing
strips between the parking spaces, and they allowed parking
in the front of the building (Tr. 357) .

But he also testified

that his copy of the plans was loaned to a distributor in California
and are no longer available but that he was very familiar with
them (Tr. 356) .
Warren Brown testified that from the very beginning
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there were "seven marked stalls across the front of the building
on an angle" in addition to other parking (Tr. 299) and that
the building was constructed for them and to meet their requirements
(Tr. 301).
Lorin Miller also testified that he had occupied the
building at 238 West 1300 South from the very beginning and
that it was built for his occupancy and to accommodate his business
and his design and that
The parking that was provided
was in front of the building * * *
and the parking was in the front
of the building, as I recall were
six or eight places that we parked.
And they utilized the parking from the beginning and their customers
parked there (Tr. 381).
It thus appears plain and not disputed that the plans
which supported the application for the building permit included
front parking for both buildings and that the front parking
was utilized from the very first use of the buildings and that
the buildings were designed to utilize the front parking spaces.
Requested Finding No. 9 (Tr. 138)
9. The placing of the cuts in the said curb
permits plaintiffs and their customers to drive across
and onto the spaces where there was formerly parking
almost perpendicular to the property line of 1300
South Street and parking a vehicle parallel to 1300
South Street, greatly reducing the number of parking
spaces that can be utilized.
The wording of this request could be improved, but
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its meaning is clear that the placing of the curbs in front
of the two buildings has greatly reduced the number of parking
spaces, regardless of whether the effective parking space now
available is one or two in front of each building.
It is clear that from the beginning there were seven
parking places in front of No. 234 and six in front of No. 238.
See Warren Brown at Tr. 299, 326, 337, 348 and 350.
Fujii at Tr. 466, 473, 475 and 486.

See George

See Lorin Miller at Tr. 381.

Exhibits P-5, P-6 and P-7 show the area originally
proposed to be taken and how a curbing would make the area inaccessible directly from the street.

Exhibit P-48 shows how the

curbing has restricted the parking, eliminating parking virtually
perpendicular to the street and compelling off-street parallel
parking with the restrictions which result from cars being parked
in the area.

Warren Brown testified that originally there were

seven stalls across the front (Tr. 299) and only two can park
in the area since the curb was put in (Tr. 296) . The same testimony
appears at Tr. 348 and 350.
Requested Finding No, 10 (Tr, 139)
10. In the case of plaintiff Three D's property,
a vehicle now parking in front of the building cannot
go forward but must back out to the curb cut; and
in the case of the Brown property, such a vehicle
must go forward and cannot back out without going
beyond plaintiff's property.
This request is simply a refinement of No. 9.

It

is only logical that when the curb was placed and cars could
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not drive over the curb, drivers were compelled to enter the
parking area at the east with the flow of traffic and park parallel
on appellants1 properties and then exit to the west in the case
of No. 234 and by backing up in the case of No. 238.

This is

indicated in the photographs which are Exhibits D-30 and D-44
and the drawing which is Exhibit P-48.
Henry Moore testified that cars parked in front of
his place of business cannot proceed to the west but must back
up in order to get out, thereby leaving only one usable parking
space where there used to be six (Tr. 448-449) .
George Fujii testified that basically there is one
effective parking place in front of each building

(Tr. 487) .

The pictures which are Exhibits D-30 and D-44 show the curb
and that there is no exit to the west from the Three D building,
not only because the property is owned by someone else but because
there is no curb cut to the west.
Requested Finding No. 11 (Tr, 139)
11.
None of the routes of access to parking
available to plaintiffs and their customers before
the curbs were put in by the defendant is now available.
This is simply the statement of an obvious but important
fact.

Whereas cars previously drove onto the front of the two

lots from the right-hand traffic lane going west, they would
now encounter curbs which are built to prevent access across
them to the property.

The real inquiry then as to requested
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Finding No. 11 is whether there was direct access to the parking
stalls previously.
Exhibit P-47 shows that there was room to back out
without impeding the flow of traffic prior to the construction
of the curb.

By reason of the improvements made, 1300 South

was changed from a land service street with one lane in each
direction to a traffic service street with two lanes in each
direction and occupying the entire street to the curb (George
Fujii, Tr. 472).

Exhibits D-25, P-39, P-40 and P-45 show the

change that has been made in the street.

There was no curb

or gutter or barrier before the late so-called

improvements

(George Fujii, Tr. 508, 533-534; Gene Fisher, Tr. 549; Lorin
Miller, Tr. 381; Ted Brown, Tr. 359; Warren Brown, Tr. 326).
Now the curb absolutely blocks access via the established rights
of way.
Requested Finding No. 12 (Tr, 139)
12. The loss of parking spaces resulting from
the building of the curb has damaged the businesses
conducted on the premises and has reduced the value
of the properties to a substantial extent.
Plaintiffs realize that the Court has found and ruled
that there is no compensable taking involved in this action
and that there remains reasonable access to the areas in front
of the buildings.

But all of the evidence was that the plaintiffs

have suffered extensive damage through the placing of the curbs
and the elimination of the front parking spaces.

There is not
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unanimity as to the extent of the damage or the best way to
calculate that damage, but there was no testimony that the businesses
and the properties have not been substantially damaged and many
testified that there was great damage.

The Court stated at

Tr. 5 94 that the measure of damage is diminution in the value
of the property, apparently preferring that to other methods
of determining the amount of damage.
There is clear testimony that loss of parking and
the construction of the curbing caused substantial damage to
the appellants.

George Fujii, an M.A.I, appraiser, testified

that, based on diminution in the value of the properties, the
damage suffered by plaintiff Three D Corporation from loss of
parking was $8,400

(Tr. 477, 485, 486) and that the damage to

the appellants Brown and Distributors was $62,700 (Tr. 485 and
486).

This is itemized in Exhibit P-48.

Gene Fisher, Property

Manager and Vice President of Three D Corporation, testified
that the damage was $2 per day per stall (Tr. 541) . Doris D. Dipo,
principal owner of Three D Corporation, testified that the damage
to her property was $5,000 per parking stall lost and that five
(5) stalls were lost (Tr. 552-553).

Henry Moore, Lessee in

the front part of the Three D building, testified that the loss
of parking was so serious that he had to change his method of
doing business by going to the customers instead of asking them
to come to his place of business (Tr. 445-446) .

Plaintiff Ted
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Brown testified that the loss of parking compelled a change
in their method of doing business (Tr. 364 and 568); that this
loss caused the business to go from a good profit to a big loss
(Tr. 368); the owners lost $64,000 in the sale of the building
because of the lack of parking which over the period of the
five and one-half year lease equals $108,620

(Tr. 570); and

that the loss of parking cost the business $1,800 per month
(Tr. 605).

Appellant Warren Brown testified that the actual

damage to the property, which was realized when the property
was sold, was $64,000 (Tr. 322); and that sale of the property
was necessary to replace the parking (Tr. 325). Lorin Miller,
lessee of the Three D building and occupant of the rear portion,
testified that his out-of-pocket expenses through loss of parking
were $10 to $20 per day (Tr. 392).
The City's own appraisers found that there was substantial
damage from loss of parking (David Hales, Tr. 288-289 and Exhibits
P-13 and P-14).

Their appraiser found damage of $6,900 for

Three D Corporation and $7,700 for the Brown property (Tr. 288).
The appraiser found $3,600 as the value of the three parking
stalls he admitted to have been lost in front of each property
(Tr. 289) .
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Requested Finding No* 13 (Tr. 139)
13. The curb cuts placed for access to the properties
of plaintiffs have approximately four-inch (4") verticle
face, whereas the curb cuts to all other properties
on the 1300 South Street project have a rounding face
of approximately one-inch (lw) height, making use
of said curb cuts unpleasant and difficult.
The purpose of requesting this Finding was to show
that the City planned special treatment for these two property
owners, who elected to challenge the City's plans.

Not only

did the City gerrymander the entire job by putting in curb and
gutter in front of every building except the two owned by the
appellants, but they also refused to give reasonably usable
driveway entrances by putting in a three and one-half to four-inch
(3% to 4") vertical block instead of a one-inch
entrance to the driveway.

(1") rolled

This request goes along with Request

No. 14, which will be next considered, and which taken together
show that the present state of affairs must be temporary and
ultimately there must be a curb and gutter and sidewalk in front
of these two properties to make a reasonable improvement district.
Appellant Ted Brown testified that at the entrance
to what the City calls the driveway is an abrupt, high curb
three and one-half inches

(3V1) high, which you can't drive

over, instead of a real driveway (Tr. 423) , and that the usable
driveway to the East of his building leads to the neighbor's
property on the East; and the only other approach is to the
West between the two buildings where there is a curb 3V1 high
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across the property

(Tr. 425), as illustrated in Exhibits P-39

and P-40.
Exhibit P-39

shows in the foreground the driveway

that leads to the neighbor's property to the East and then the
abrupt curb just in the foreground from the "No Parking" sign,
with the driveway between the two buildings shown beyond the
truck parked in the picture.

Exhibit P-40 shows the Diamond

Glass front, which is the Three D building, and just beyond
that is the driveway referred to in Mr. Ted Brown's testimony,
which has a three and one-half inch
usable driveway.

(3Vf) curb instead of a

The immediate foreground of Exhibit P-40 is

not a driveway at all but simply an abrupt curb.

This curb

is shown better in Exhibit P-41, which shows the 3hn

abrupt

curb in the middle of the picture, with the much higher abrupt
curb both in the immediate foreground and beyond the driveway.
Exhibit P-45 shows the easterly curb of which Mr. Brown testified.
The appraiser George Fujii testified that Exhibit
P-4 5 shows the high curb in front of the Distributors building
and the curb cut in the concrete, which is three and one-half
to four inches
P-39

(3% to 4") high.

(Tr. 468-469).

It is also shown in Exhibit

He further testified at Tr. 501 about this

picture and that the abrupt curb plus the parking signs tends
to intimidate would-be customers so that there is only one effective
parking place in front of the Three D building.
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Exhibit D-19 shows the smooth driveway East of the
Distributors building, which leads to the neighbor's property,
as contrasted with the abrupt 3h"

curb to the left of it in

that picture.
It also appears from the testimony and the Exhibit
pictures that the City gave special and unfavorable treatment
to the street and the curbs and the lack of sidewalk in front
of the property of the appellants.

This plainly appears in

Exhibits D-25, D-30, D-36, P-39, P-40 and D-41, which show that
a curb and sidewalk are placed in front of the properties except
the appellants1 properties, where there is an abrupt curb with
no gutter and no sidewalk, resulting in a depression which accumulates water, the whole being unsightly and unfinished and indicating
rather plainly that before the project is finally finished,
there will have to be a continuation of the regular curb past
the appellants1 properties and the placing of a sidewalk.

This

is the testimony also of appellant Ted Brown (Tr. 426-428, 468-469)
and of George Fujii (Tr. 501-503).
Exhibit D-18, the appraisal made for the City, shows
that this Special Improvement District was planned as a uniform
district, with curbs and sidewalks on both sides and involving
the taking of a portion of property from each of the thirty-two
(32) owners.

This appears from the letter in the front of the

exhibit dated October 29, 1982, which shows property to be taken
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from all of the abutting owners including the appellants as
Parcel No's. 106 and 107, with the intention of providing uniform
sidewalks indicated at page 7 of that letter in the bottom paragraph,
which also recognizes that an increased parking problem will
result from the building of the project.

This original plan

is also made plain in. letters from the respondent

(Exhibits

P-2, P-5 and P-6).
Requested Finding No, 14 (Tr, 139)
14. The resultant conditions of the properties
of the plaintiffs are that water from their properties
and from the gutter in front of the other properties
now washes on to the front of the property of plaintiffs
and accumulates there without draining and there is
a sidewalk in front of all the other properties on
1300 South Street except in front of the properties
of plaintiffs, as shown on the photographs in evidence.
The second part of this requested Finding as to there
being a sidewalk in front of all properties except these two
was approved by the Court, but it didn't get into the actual
Findings

(Tr. 139 and 128).

We think it is only reasonable

to go a step further and show that a gutter is needed to drain
the water which is now accumulating in front of the buildings
of these two plaintiffs.

The pictures which are Exhibits P-39

and P-40 show how the water is puddling at the present time.
The need for correcting this is shown also by the testimony
of Henry Moore

(Tr. 449-450) and George Fujii (Tr. 502). It

is plain from the pictures that the improvement district is
incomplete and that ultimately the curb barrier will be replaced
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by a curb and gutter and the puddling area will be replaced
by a sidewalk so as to make a uniform and attractive improvement
district and a decent looking street.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Credible evidence offered by the plaintiffs-

appellants should be considered by the Court as established
facts on a Motion to Dismiss.

The failure of the trial judge

to make the requested Findings cannot be for lack of credible
and uncontradicted evidence but because the trial judge apparently
believed that the additional facts relied on by the appellants
were superfluous because there was no physical taking of property
and because there was some access to the impacted property.
II.

The building permits issued for the buildings

constructed by the plaintiffs or for the plaintiffs were issued
in reliance on plans showing as off-street parking in part,
angled parking in front of each building so as to permit retail
services from those portions of those buildings.

The buildings

were constructed in reliance on these parking rights. The closing
of these established routes of access amounts to a taking of
property rights even though no physical portion of the property
is actually occupied by the improvement.
III.

The respondent developed the project in a manner

which did not require condemnation action, although portions
of the properties of all owners except the two appellants1 properties
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were physically taken and paid for.

These appellants had well-

established and valuable rights of access to these parking spaces.
In those circumstances an action in inverse condemnation will
lie.
IV.

Should the Court hold either that inverse condem-

nation will not lie under any circumstances or that it will
not lie where there is no physical taking of a piece of land,
then the appellants rely on the demand made against Salt Lake
City for compensation for interference with their established
parking rights and means of access to their properties from
the street, which action lies under the governmental immunity
statute, Utah Code Annotated, Title 63, Chapter 30.

The claim

is Exhibit P-8.
V.

This is really a refinement of Point II and

is based more precisely on cases involving the closing of established
access routes where the areas previously reached directly may,
after the building of the improvement, be reached only indirectly.
By reducing established parking places from six (6) to one (1)
so far as plaintiff Three D is concerned and from seven (7)
to two (2) as to Browns and Distributors, with one of those
being a rather awkward access, the damage is so extreme that
it is not permissible to say that reasonable access has been
provided.

The importance of specific parking places related

to these two buildings constructed in reliance on the parking
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is too immediate and too substantial to be glossed over with
the phrase that "reasonable access" has been given.
VI.

The original project as planned by respondent

Salt Lake City was to establish a wide street with uniform curbs,
gutters and sidewalks on both sides of the entire project from
150 East 1300 South to 400 West 1300 South.

This uniformity

was provided as to all properties except appellants1 two properties
where an unsightly and impractical high curb abutted into the
street and where no sidewalk whatsoever was provided, leaving
a depressed, unsightly area subject to accumulation of surface
water from street runoff.

It is plain from the photographs

and the testimony that ultimately Salt Lake City needs to take
another step and make this a uniform special improvement district,
thus accomplishing an ultimate physical taking without having
to pay for the appurtenant parking rights.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHAT IS STATUS OF PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE ON
APPEAL FROM A MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED AT
THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE?
Appellants endeavored to simplify the appeal by proposing
additional Findings of Fact based on the evidence presented
so as to show the nature of the underlying facts on which appellants
rely.

The trial judge accepted some of these additional requested

Findings and rejected others, with no indication of his reasons.
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Appellants recognize that Findings of Fact made upon
a Motion to Dismiss following plaintiffs1 evidence in compliance
with Rules 41(b) and 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure will
be upheld unless the evidence is "unbelievable or insufficient
in some regard"

(Johnson v. Bell

(Utah 1983) f 666 P.2d 308,

311) and the Court will review the facts in the light most favorable
to the Findings, assuming that the Court's Findings were "established
by a preponderance of the evidence" (Lawrence v. Bamberger,
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335); but the Findings as made do not
preclude and are not inconsistent with additional and important
facts upon which the trial court refused to make Findings.
This is important where the nature of the rights involved are
not general but specifically established and where the substituted
access is "reasonable" as a generality but not where specific
rights are involved and there is great damage resulting to the
owners.
We suggest that additional Findings may be made where
the trial court refused to find a material fact, which was admitted
or undisputed

(Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 170 At.2d 267,

9 5 ALR 2d 751) or where the meaning of the trial judge is not
disclosed by the Findings as made.
185 N.E.2d 650, 100 ALR 2d 459.)

(Roseman v. Day, 345 Mass. 93,
Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error,

§ 900, suggests that the appellate court can make findings "where
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the evidence was such, as a matter of law, as to require a particular
finding."
As stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Appeal and Error,
§ 1675, page 667:
. • • where the facts are undisputed
and the inferences are only one
way, the appellate court may and
should supply the finding.
If the trial court erred in failing to make further
Findings, it would expedite final determination if this Court
could indicate whether there is substantial and uncontradicted
evidence on the additional requested issues, rather than remand
the case for further findings.
The trial court found there was no physical taking
of appellants1 property

(Finding 5, Tr. 127-128) and that two

(2) curb cuts allowed continued access to the property.
the Finding omits these undisputed facts:

But

The buildings were

based on building permits issued by Salt Lake City with plans
showing off-street parking in front of the buildings, six (6)
parking spaces in one, and seven

(7) in front of the other,

to accommodate retail services in the front of the buildings;
and these spaces are now reduced to use by one car in front
of one building and one or at most two in front of the other,
resulting in necessary changed use and great loss of value in
the properties.

Established routes of access were blocked by

the curb as constructed.
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These additional facts must be taken into account to
determine what the rights of access were, whether they are property
rights, whether they have been substantially taken away and whether
the resulting damage is so substantial as to be compensable.
Additional Findings are needed also to show that the
City originally planned uniform curbs, gutters, sidewalks and
driveways, taking a piece of the property from each of the 32
property owners, and then changed the plans because appellants
insisted on compensation

for loss of parking, then discriminated

against appellants, leaving the district partially completed
and destroying appellants1 property values by first going only
to the property line, thus destroying the parking rights, so
that when the property is later taken to make uniform the curb,
gutter, sidewalk and driveways, there will no longer be any
existing parking rights.

It was because of this situation that

the appellants asked the court to take judicial notice of a
very similar action in Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County v. Builders Milling Supply, No. 228714 (Tr. 233). A condemnation action
was brought whereby a strip of property abutting the street
was taken, this being property where there were established
parking rights.

The verdict of the jury was to award substantial

damage ($31,728.75 - p. 41 of that file) for loss of these parking
rights, which situation would have existed as to the rights
of plaintiffs if the City had proceeded with its announced uniform
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plan to take a strip of property from each of the abutting owners
so as to make a uniform Special Improvement District with a
widened street, curbs, gutters and sidewalks.

(This file is

lodged with the exhibits in this case.)
It is not possible to make a cohesive attack on the
Conclusions of Law without having before this Court the complete
facts, the rights of appellants, and the extent of damages suffered.
Appellants would concede that if no specific parking
rights exist and no specific access to those parking rights,
and the City wants to widen the street thereby increasing traffic
and there is only a reasonable interference with appellants'
access to their properties, and only slight damages, there would
be no cause of action and the Conclusions of Law should stand.
If this Court cannot examine the additional facts
established by the evidence and omitted from the Findings of
the trial court, then the case should be remanded for further
Findings on the establishment of parking rights and access routes,
the construction of buildings in reliance on the approved plans,
the extent of restrictions resulting from the improvements as
they now exist, and the extent of damage to property values
of appellants.

There should also be Findings as to the original

intent of the City, the reason for the change, and the halffinished curb, gutter and sidewalk area in front of appellants1
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properties, which will ultimately be changed through a taking
of a strip of their property.
POINT II
DOES A PROPERTY OWNER HAVE AN ESTABLISHED
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PARKING SPACES SHOWN ON
THE BDILDING PLANS AND USED CONSTANTLY FOLLOWING
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BDILDING MANY YEARS AGO?
Finding 6 (Tr. 128) includes construction of the buildings
and use of the buildings for many years.

This omits the fact

that the construction was based on building permits, which are
plainly documented
parking.

(Ex. P-1 and D-31) with plans showing the

Unfortunately, the plans have been lost by the City

(Tr. 260) and by the builder

(Tr. 262) and by the appellants

(Tr. 356) , but the testimony was plain and not disputed that
the plans showed off-street parking in front of the buildings
and that the buildings were constructed to utilize the front
parking spaces.

(See the Statement of Facts, pages 8 to 10.)

The Utah Constitution says:
Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation. (Article
I, Section 22) (Emphasis supplied)
In Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit

(1893),

9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, the issue was whether the defendant could
construct a street railroad track so close to the property of
the plaintiff as to make it difficult for the plaintiff to use
its property.

The Court noted that the street could be owned
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by the City or by the abutting owners and said:
In either case the abutters have
the right to have the street kept
open and not obstructed so as
to interfere with their easements,
and materially diminish the value
of their property . . . These
rights were inducements to purchasers,
became a part of the purchase,
are appurtenances to the land
which cannot be so embarrassed
or abridged as to materially interfere
with its proper use and enjoyment,
and they are, in effect, property
of which the owners cannot be
deprived without due compensation*
(p. 232)
In that case there were no specific routes of access which had
been used by the plaintiff and which were being interfered with.
This Dooly case was referred to in Utah Road Commission
v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917, which was decided against
the property owner.

The defendant operated a wrecking yard

one block long, the easterly portion of which had been developed
and had a definite access way established, whereas the westerly
half was undeveloped and it was this westerly half which was
being impacted by the widening and improving of the arterial
highway.
This Court noted that if there were an established
easement of access "and we agree that where such is taken it
would constitute the taking of property covered by our eminent
domain statute" (p. 309), and made a point of the fact that
as to the westerly portion, "No existing easement to their remaining
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land having been taken, no compensation is required" (p. 310) ,
observing that, "An easement of access contemplates a traveled
way from the property to the highway."

By this test we have

established easements of access to the six (6) parking places
and seven (7) parking places, although the Finding of Fact does
not go so far as to state that there are that number of parking
spaces and that they have historically been approached separately
and from the street, thus constituting thirteen (13) established
easements of access.
Hampton v. State of Utah through its Road Commission
(1968), 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708, was an action in inverse
condemnation where the plaintiffs alleged a substantial and
material impairment of access to their property constituting
a taking, which the trial court had dismissed on the ground
of sovereign immunity but which was reversed by this Court for
determination of whether the plaintiffs1 property had in fact
been taken by denial of their free and convenient access to
their property.

This case squarely holds that a substantial

and material impairment of access is a taking but does not define
what material and substantial impairment amounts to.

Again,

we refer this Court to the facts of this case, which were not
covered by a Finding, although requested, to the effect that
thirteen

(13) parking places were established in accordance

with building plans and were accessed from the street regularly
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and continuously, that they were blocked by Salt Lake City's
curb and that the damage in the form of diminution of property
values was great.
Keiffer v. King County
P.2d 408.

(1977), 89 Wash.2d 369, 572

This Washington case is the closest we have come

to a case in point.

We submit that no Utah decision closes

the door on our action.

The question is how much have we been

damaged through loss of parking spaces and that was the question
decided in Keiffer v. King County.

The headnote of this case

read:

O w n e r s of c o m m e r c i a l p r o p e r t y
s o u g h t damages from a county on
t h e t h e o r y t h a t , by i n s t a l l i n g
c u r b i n g a l o n g t h e a d j a c e n t road
r i g h t - o f - w a y , t h e county had so
impaired access to the property
as t o e f f e c t an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
t a k i n g of such p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t
j u s t compensation.
The S u p e r i o r
Court, King County, Robert W. Winsor,
J . , found a compensable t a k i n g ,
and t h e c o u n t y a p p e a l e d .
The
Supreme C o u r t , U t t e r , J . , h e l d
t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence supported
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g .
The C o u r t ' s own statement of the case i s as follows:
Two i s s u e s are presented on appeal:
(1) under what c i r c u m s t a n c e s may
the r e s t r i c t i o n of access to p r i v a t e
p r o p e r t y , r e s u l t i n g from the construct i o n of p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s located
within the governmental right-of-way
d e s i g n e d t o r e g u l a t e t h e flow
of t r a f f i c i n t o and o u t of such
p r o p e r t y , c o n s t i t u t e a compensable
t a k i n g ; and (2) d i d t h e t r i a l
court e r r in t r e a t i n g the determination
of degree of impairment as a question
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of fact. We find the Superior
Court resolved these issues correctly
and affirm its order.
In that case a two-lane road was widened to become
four lanes and curbs were erected on the edge of the improved
road within the right-of-way and for the purpose of reducing
traffic hazard, which would exist if vehicles were allowed to
back onto the roadway from the respondents1 property out of
their parking places as they had previously done.

This resulted

in reducing the parking places from eighteen cars to at most
five cars in front of the plaintiffs1 buildings.

The Court

treated each of these parking places as a unit and the trial
court found that the curb and the curb cuts denied
. . . reasonable access to the
parking which is functionally
necessary to utilize each of such
structures for their highest and
best use and/or the businesses
being operated therein.
The Court held that total elimination of access is
not necessary to create liability (although in our case there
is total elimination of access over the means which had been
established and used for many years), but the question is whether
there is a substantial impairment, which is a question of either
fact or law.

There the reduction was from eighteen to five.

Here it is from thirteen to three.
Other cases holding there is a taking of property
rights where right of access is impeded or impaired and no land
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is taken are:

Morris v. Oregon Short Line, 36 Utah 14, 102

P. 629, 631; Farris v. City of Twin Falls (1959), 81 Idaho 583,
347 P.2d

996, 998; Oklahoma Turnpike Authority

v. Chandler

(Okla. 1957), 316 P.2d 828, 829, 832; City of Chicago v. Holt
(Minn.Ct.App. 1985), 360 N.W.2d 390; In re Sansom Street in
City of Philadelphia, 143 A. 134, 136; Miller v. City of Beaver
Falls (Superior Court Pa. 1951) 182 A.2d 34, 36-38; Troup v. New
Bethlehem Borough, 122 Pa. Super. 198, 186 A. 306; Filler v. City
of Minot (N.D. 1979), 281 N.W.2d 237, 242.
It is clear from the cases, including the Utah cases,
that there is a taking when rights of access are impeded, impaired
or restricted and whether that is compensable depends on the
extent of the damage.
The trial judge was misled by the fact that there
was no physical taking of land.

In Conclusion of Law No. 2

(Tr. 128), the Court concluded that installation of the curb
did not restrict access "so unreasonably as to make it a taking
within the meaning of Utah law" and then in Conclusion of Law
No. 6 held that plaintiffs have failed to show a taking.
The extent of the taking and the resultant damage
are not covered by the Court's Findings and the actual facts
need to be considered by this Court to determine that there
was a complete closing of all of the former routes of access
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and that this was definitely a taking which resulted in very
great damage.
POINT III
WILL ACTION IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIE
WHERE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL LOSS OF ACCESS
BUT NO PHYSICAL APPROPRIATION?
In the Court's final judgment there was no point made
that remedy in the form of inverse condemnation was improper.
the following cases, cited under Point II, sustain the remedy
by action in the form of inverse condemnation where there was
no physical taking of land but only impairment of access: Hampton
v. State of Utah, supra; Dooly v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit, supra;
Morris v. Oregon Short Line, supra; Farris v. City of Twin Falls,
supra; Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, supra; Filler
v. City of Minot, supra; Troup v. New Bethlehem Borough, supra;
and Finkelstein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pa.Cmnwlth,
354 A.2d 14.
WILL AN ACTION
WHERE THERE IS
BUT NO PHYSICAL
DEMAND ON SALT

POINT IV
LIE AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY
SUBSTANTIAL LOSS OF ACCESS
APPROPRIATION, FOLLOWING
LAKE CITY WHICH WAS DENIED?

The Memorandum Decision of the trial court disposing
of defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply
with the Governmental Immunity Act made considerable point of
the question whether there was a "taking."

The Court said:
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It remains to be seen whether
the facts will bear out a taking
in the legal sense. (Tr. 30-32)
Because of this issue on the Governmental Immunity
Act and the Court's problem with the matter of "taking," claim
was filed with Salt Lake City on July 9, 1984 (Ex. P-8) .

The

Complaint was thereafter amended to include a Second Cause of
Action based on denial of that claim

(Tr. 77-79).

This was

done for the purpose of fitting into the Court's Memorandum
Decision suggesting that if there was no taking in the legal
sense, there might still be a remedy under the Governmental
Immunity Act.
This Court reviewed the Governmental

Immunity Act

with reference to impaired access of property in St. George,
Utah, in Holt v. Utah State Road Commission
2d 4, 511 P. 2d 1286.

(1973), 30 Utah

In that case there was the construction

of an underpass on public property, which impaired access to
the plaintiff's property.

The court said:

There is no taking of property
involved in this action."
and said that in the absence of a taking, there is no recovery
for damages even though the construction "may impair or adversely
affect the convenience of access to property" and went on to
say that Section 63-30-6, U.C.A. 1953, must be narrowly interpreted
and gives no remedy in the absence of a taking.

The court did

not mention the fact that the Constitution in Article I, Section
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22, protects against damage to property as well as the taking
of property.

Holt c i t e s six (6) Utah cases as supporting t h i s statement:
The law has long been e s t a b l i s h e d
i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t under t h o s e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e r e c a n be no
recovery from the S t a t e for damages
b e c a u s e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a
h i g h w a y may i m p a i r or a d v e r s e l y
a f f e c t t h e c o n v e n i e n c e of a c c e s s
to p r o p e r t y .
The f i r s t

of t h e s e i s S t a t e v . F o u r t h D i s t r i c t Court

94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502.

(1937),

This Court granted a Writ of P r o h i b i t i o n

a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e Road Commission from proceeding to build a
viaduct in the center of a public s t r e e t in Provo without making
a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h a b u t t i n g p r o p e r t y owners to compensate them
for impairment of a c c e s s , although t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s would continue
to abut on the s t r e e t .
This Court s a i d :
. Under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s S t a t e ,
a p a r t y , whose p r o p e r t y i s about
t o be s p e c i a l l y damaged in any
s u b s t a n t i a l degree for p u b l i c
u s e , has t h e same r i g h t s and i s
g i v e n t h e same r e m e d i e s f o r t h e
p r o t e c t i o n of h i s p r o p e r t y from
t h e t h r e a t e n e d i n j u r y as would
be a c c o r d e d him i f h i s p r o p e r t y
were a c t u a l l y taken and appropriated
for such u s e . (p. 393)
I t went on t o say t h a t where no s u i t in condemnation i s going
t o be i n s t i t u t e d ,

a c o u r t of e q u i t y could t a k e

jurisdiction
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where the only other remedy would be presenting a claim to the
Board of Examiners (p. 396) and that the protection of Section
22 of Article I of the Constitution applies
. . . whether the injury complained
of by the plaintiffs in the injunction
suit is considered a 'taking 1
of property, or a 'damaging1 of
property. (p. 397)
and again:

We b e l i e v e , however, t h a t in i n c o r p o r a t i n g in the C o n s t i t u t i o n a
provision r e q u i r i n g j u s t compensation
f o r p r o p e r t y damaged for p u b l i c
u s e , i t was i n t e n d e d t o put an
end t o s u c h c o n t r o v e r s y and t o
p r o t e c t the damaged property owner
e q u a l l y w i t h t h e p r o p e r t y owner
whose land was p h y s i c a l l y entered
upon. (p. 39 8)

and again:
We t h i n k i f a c a s e a r i s e s where
t h e r e i s no other method of enforcing
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t except
by s u i t a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e , t h e n
i t must be c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e
S t a t e has given i t s consent to
be sued in such a c a s e .
and t h e Court p r o h i b i t e d

proceedings u n t i l

arrangements

had

been made to compensate the p l a i n t i f f s .
The second c a s e was H j o r t h
(1952),

121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907.

against

the individual

v. Whittenburg,

et

al.

There s u i t was brought

Road Commissioners f o r alleged damage

to property where the Road Commission had r a i s e d the grade four
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feet in front of the plaintiff's property.

The Court held that

the individuals were not liable, but here there is no treatment
of the nature of the right of access or the remedy for interfering
with it.
The third case was Fairclough v. Salt Lake County
(I960), 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105.

There the County had

lowered the grade to 16 feet below plaintifffs land, thereby
causing considerable inconvenience of access to the plaintiff
and the Court held that sovereign immunity was not waived for
such damage and that the Constitutional provision was not selfexecuting.

There was no mention in the case of whether there

was already a means of access to the road or an established
access to the roadway or whether it was possible to reach the
roadway or in what manner before or after.
The fourth case was Springville Banking v. State Road
Commission

(1960), 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157.

This was an

action in mandamus to compel members of the State Road Commission
to initiate eminent domain proceedings to assess damages allegedly
caused by impairment of access to plaintiff's property, which
would result from placing a concrete island in the middle of
a street in Springville, Utah, thereby compelling southbound
traffic to make a U-turn and go extra distance to reach the
plaintiff's property.

The Court held that the action would

not lie and that this was the type of burden property owners
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were compelled to bear as members of the public and noted that
plaintiff did not allege any great damage or special burden
with this statement:
On the other hand, if public officials
act arbitrarily and unreasonably,
causing, for example, total destruction
of the means to get in and out
of one's property, without any
reasonable justification for doing
so in the public interest, in
a manner that imposes a special
burden on one not shared by the
public generally, principles of
equity no doubt could be invoked
to prevent threatened action of
such character or to remove any
instrumentality born of such conduct,
(p. 103)
The fifth case is State v. Parker

(1961), 13 Utah

2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585, where an owner near highway construction
sought to intervene in an action to show consequential damage
to his property from vibration and noise.

The Court noted that

the moving party's property was not connected to the condemned
tract and there was no discussion of taking or closing an easement
of access or any other easement.
The sixth case was Anderson Investment Corp. v. State
of Utah (1972), 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144.

This was an action

for injunction against constructing a viaduct in the middle
of the street, alleging that there would be diminution of the
easements of light, air, view and access.

The construction

of the viaduct approach would compel customers of the plaintiff
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to make a U-turn and travel extra distance to reach the property,
much as in Springville Banking v. Road Commission, supra.

In

a footnote the Court said the State was immune from the suit
to enjoin "even if action for damage would lie for interference
with plaintiff's easements," suggesting that such an action
would lie, given sufficient damage.
In the light of Hampton, supra, Miya, infra, and Keiffer,
supra, a re-examination of applicable remedies for what is plainly
prohibited by the Constitution seems appropriate.
The year after Holt, in Utah State Road Commission
v. Miya

(1974), 526 P.2d 926, the court reviewed a case from

Davis County where a piece of land was taken and then a viaduct
was constructed on that land and on the adjoining street, which
impaired Miya's easement of view, and the unsightly viaduct
damaged his remaining property, which had a highest and best
use for residential purposes and this use was damaged to the
extent of $8,000.

The court observed that a median divider,

which only interferes with the free flow of traffic in front
of a property, does not entitle the owner to compensation and
went on to say:
H o w e v e r , w h e r e a p o l i c e power
i s e x e r c i s e d a s an i n c i d e n t a l
r e s u l t of t h e e x e r c i s e of eminent
domain, j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n i s due
i f the market value of the p r o p e r t y
has been diminished. The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of j u s t compensation
f o r t h e t a k i n g o r d a m a g i n g of
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p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y f o r p u b l i c use
i s i n no way affected by the f a c t
t h a t the e x p r o p r i a t o r i s e x e r c i s i n g
t h e p o l i c e power.
The r i g h t s
of a c c e s s , l i g h t , and a i r a r e
easements a p p u r t e n a n t to the land
of an a b u t t i n g owner on a s t r e e t ;
they c o n s t i t u t e property rights
forming p a r t of the owner's e s t a t e .
These s u b s t a n t i a l property r i g h t s ,
although subject to reasonable
r e g u l a t i o n , may not be taken away
or impaired without j u s t compensation,
[ c i t i n g the case of Hampton v. S t a t e
Road Commission, supra]
(p. 929)
Surely,

t h e t a k i n g of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t of access cannot be

held non-compensable simply because no piece of land i s p h y s i c a l l y
expropriated.
The n e x t y e a r ,

i n 1975, t h i s

Court d e c i d e d

S e r v i c e & Supply v . The S t a t e of Utah, 533 P.2d 882.
case t h e r e was no physical taking of p r o p e r t y .
of a v i a d u c t down a p u b l i c s t r e e t made i t

Bailey
In t h a t

The c o n s t r u c t i o n
impossible for

the

owner t o have access with long t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r s , as he had been
a b l e t o do when t h e whole s t r e e t was a v a i l a b l e .
p o i n t or driveway was not closed or impaired.
used t h e language of

His access

The Court again

"taking" and did not d i s c u s s "damage" t o

the p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t of a c c e s s .

The Court held:

P r i o r d e c i s i o n s of t h i s c o u r t
have e s t a b l i s h e d t h e p r i n c i p l e
t h a t t h e r e can be no r e c o v e r y
from t h e S t a t e f o r damages where
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e highway
o r t h e e r e c t i o n of s t r u c t u r e s
w i t h i n t h e p u b l i c r i g h t of way
impair or a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t the
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convenience of access to the property
of an abutting owner. (p. 883)
Perhaps the distinguishing feature is that there was no blocking
of the customary means of access but only a limitation of the
type of vehicle which could use that means of access or that
the damage was not specific enough or great enough.
Appellants ask the Court to consider that where the
established routes of access are blocked, there is either a
taking or a damage in the Constitutional sense and relief should
be given either by inverse condemnation or under Section 6 of
the Governmental Immunity Act.

The damage here is much greater

in amount than in the Miya case, supra, and is more direct than
in Bailey because here there was complete closing of the established
access route.

The use of the property, constructed in reliance

on the parking spaces, had to be changed from retail servicing
customers or else parking had to be acquired.

In the Three

D case, the lessee went to off-premise services. In the Distributors
case, the owners sold the building as a means of acquiring offstreet parking adjacent to the building to enable them to continue
their retail use.

Their loss was $64,000.
POINT V

IS THERE DENIAL OF REASONABLE ACCESS WHERE
PARKING SPACES ACCESSIBLE FROM THE STREET
ARE MADE INACCESSIBLE DIRECTLY?
The position of appellants is that what occurred on
13 0 0 South Street was a taking of the easement of access which
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the appellants had to their parking spaces.

We have used the

words "impairment" and "restriction" but suggest that a more
appropriate phrase is that the established means of access were
"blocked."
We have cited several cases where the established
means of access were closed and there was substituted an indirect
or circuitous route of access and where also, as in the Keiffer
case, supra, the number of usable parking spaces was reduced.
These cases are as follows:

Keiffer v. King County;

Finkelstein v. Commonwealth; Farris v. City of Twin Falls; Oklahoma
Turnpike Authority v. Chandler; City of Chicago v. Holt; Filler
v. City of Minot; and Miller v. City of Beaver Falls.
We are not aware of any cases where the established
access was blocked and new approaches were given to reach the
property where recovery was denied.
POINT VI
SHOULD THE COORT ROLE THAT A PHYSICAL TAKING
IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF RECOVERY WHERE THE
CITY ATTEMPTS TO DO IN TWO SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS
WHAT IT STARTED OUT TO DO IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING?
In Springville Banking v. Burton and other Road Commissioners, supra, action was brought in mandamus against the individual
Road Commissioners as a means of avoiding sovereign immunity
which protected the State from direct attack. The Court said:
We believe and hold that the procedure
chosen by plaintiff was an effort
indirectly to do that which repeatedly
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we have held could not be done
directly, which is dispositive
of this case on that ground,
(p. 102)
This argument was made to the trial court in the Memorandum
Supporting Motion for New Trial

(Tr. 162-163) in support of

Requested Finding No. 13.
It is very plain that Salt Lake City commenced this
Special Improvement District intending to take a piece of property
from all of the abutting owners.

(See pages 18 to 19)

The

original appraisal made for Salt Lake City included damages
for destroying parking rights incident to the taking (Ex. D-17,
Parcel 106 P.6, Parcel 107, p. 6)

Civil Action No. 228714 of

the Third Judicial District, of which the Court took judicial
notice (Tr. 233) , is illustrative of how a jury can weigh destruction
of parking rights in connection with a physical taking of property.
This Court's case of Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, supra,
shows plainly that where there is a physical taking, damages
for impairment of easement will also be included.
The unfinished, incompleted aspects of the Improvement
District are plain from the photographs in evidence (Ex's. D-25,
D-30, D-36, P-39, P-40 and D-41) as evidence that ultimately
the second step will have to be taken before the street widening
projects can really be called an "improvement district."
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CONCLUSION
The Findings of Fact as made are incomplete and it
was an error to refuse to make the additional Findings as requested.
This Court should either accept the additional requested Findings
or remand the case for completion of the Findings.
The clearly established facts refute the Conclusions
of Law that there was no taking, that the substituted routes
of access were reasonable and that there was no compensable
damage.

The Improvement District is not completed in front

of appellants1 properties where there is no sidewalk, no gutter
and only difficult driveway entrances. Completion of the Improvement
District will require physical appropriation of parts of appellants1
properties, which entire process would entitle appellants to
recover damage to parking rights under the theory relied on
by the respondent, namely:

The City can block appellants" estab-

lished rights of way and parking spaces so long as their real
estate is not physically appropriated and so long as any type
of access is given to the parking area which has been blocked
off; the compelled change of use of appellants1 buildings and
the great damage to their property values is non-compensable;
and when the improvements are completed the parking rights will
already have been destroyed.
This Court should reject that sophistry and hold that
blocking out established access to parking spaces, in reliance
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upon which the buildings were constructed, is a taking under
the Utah Constitution and where the indirect access afforded
results in substantial damage to property values and to the
best use of the property, that damage should be determined and
awarded and the case should be remanded for determination of
that damage.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP

Attorneys for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
was served on the respondent this 18th day of March, 1987, by
mailing four

(4) true and correct copies thereof via United

States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler,
Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 125 Circuit Court Building,
425 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
respondent.

84111, attorney for
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salt Lake County Utah

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah

:

corporation, et al.f

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO. C-84-3228

vs •
SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation,
Defendant.

:
:

I understand the allegations of the Complaint to be as follows:
Plaintiffs own real property located on 1300 South in Salt Lake
City, and maintain a business thereon.

Directly in front of the

business are thirteen parking spaces which have been used by
plaintiffs1 customers for a number of years.
In June of 1983 the City commenced widening 1300 South.
None of plaintiffs' property was "taken" in the literal sense, but
access to the property was limited, allegedly to the point that
the parking spaces cannot be used.
The City has moved to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff
has not complied with the Governmental Immunity Act.
admits that it has not.

Plaintiff

The issue, therefore, is whether the

Governmental Immunity Act is applicable.
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pitfHREE D CORP. , ET AL
V. SALT LAKE CITY

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Whether the Governmental Immunity Act applies depends upon
whether the actions of the City amount to a "taking" or are
merely an exercise of the police power resulting in consequential
damages.

The cases on this point are somewhat confusing.

In

Hampton v. State Road Comm'n., 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708
(1968), the Supreme Court held that blocking access to a driveway
with a fence and guardrail 4*a& a "taking."

In Holt v. Utah State

Road Comm'n., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973), it was held
that construction of an underpass which impaired access was not a
"taking."

In Utah State Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926

(1974) construction of a viaduct which impaired the abutting
property owner's view was a "taking."

In Bailey Service & Supply

Corp. v. State, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1973), the Court reversed a
plaintiff's verdict on the basis that construction of a viaduct
which prevented large trucks from access to a warehouse was not a
"taking."

Springville Baking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,

349 P.2d 157, held that construction of an island which impaired
access

was not a "taking."
The common thread that runs through these cases is that a

landowner is not entitled to use every foot of his frontage for
access, nor does he have a right to travel in any particular
direction from his property or to use any particular part of the
public right-of-way.

But he is entitled to reasonable access

his property.
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PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Taking the allegations of the Complaint alone, it cannot be
said that a cause of action is not stated.

It remains to be seen

whether the facts will bear out a taking in the legal sense.
The Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Mr. Bird is requested to

prepare an appropriate Order, and submit it to Mr. Maughan
pursuant to Rule 2.9.
Dated this

2 /

day of July, 1984.

<yxwft
SCe¥T TrKPTlELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
this 3(

day of July, 1984:

Richard L. Bird
Attorney for Plaintiffs
333 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul G. Maughan
Attorney for Defendant
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

V/.'O1- .—
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f)
By j\h

Richard L. Bird, Jr. (#0338)
David J. Bird (#0334)
RICHARDS, BIRD & KOMP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8987

U2.
'\SL

%A*\ *) « v *

^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Civil No. C84-3228
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, the
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on the 27th day of November,
1985.

The trial was then continued to the 2nd day of December,

1985, and then further continued to the 4th day of December,
1985.

Plaintiffs were represented by counsel Richard L. Bird,

Jr., and the defendant was represented by Arthur L. Keesler,
Jr., Assistant City Attorney.

Plaintiffs were allowed to amend

their Complaint by including Ted R. Brown and Warren B. Brown,
Trustee, as owners of the property at 234 West 1300 South and
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2
Distributors Inc, a Colorado corporation, as parties plaintiff*
The Court, after reviewing the evidence, including the testimony
of all of the witnesses, and the arguments of counsel, hereby
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Three D Corporation is the owner of real property

located at 238 West 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Warren B. Brown, Trustee, and Ted R. Brown are

now the owners of real property located at 234 West 1300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, which property is under lease to Distributors
Inc. Colorado and Distributors Inc. Utah.
3. On June 1, 1983, defendant commenced the construction
of a Special Improvement District which provided for the installation
of curb and gutter and the widening of the roadway of 1300 South
Street.
4.

In order to widen the boundaries of 1300 South

Street between 200 and 300 West Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah,
the defendant attempted to purchase a portion of plaintiffs1
property which fronted on said street.
5.

The plaintiffs refused to sell any portion of

their frontage property for the street widening project unless
they were paid for damage to their property from loss of parking
spaces.

As a result, the City extended the roadway, widening

only to the existing boundaries of 1300 South Street and no

00013^
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portion of the roadway or curb was constructed upon property
owned by the defendants. Two curb cuts were made allowing plaintiffs
continued access to their property.
6.

Building permits were issued by Salt Lake City

in 1956 as to Three D Corporation and in 1957 as to what is
now the Brown property based upon applications with plot plans
attached showing parking at the south end of the buildings on
the owners' property accessible from the street, six (6) parking
spaces in front of the Three D building and seven (7) parking
spaces in front of the Distributors Inc. building, as shown
on some of the exhibits.
7.

The building of each plaintiff was constructed

with offices and areas for serving drop-in customers with sales
and services, which buildings were so used from 1956 as to the
Three D building and from 1957 as to the Distributors Inc. building.
^y^

8.

The placing of the curb at the property lines

of the plaintiffs has prevented plaintiffs and their customers
from driving from 1300 South Street directly into each of their
angle parking spaces.
v*o

9.

The placing of the cuts in the said curb permits

plaintiffs and their customers to drive across and onto the
spaces where there was formerly parking almost perpendicular
to the property line of 1300 South Street and parking a vehicle
parallel to 1300 South Street, greatly reducing the number of

000128
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parking spaces that can be utilized.
M}

10.

In the case of plaintiff Three D's property,

a vehicle now parking in front of the building cannot go forward
but must back out to the curb cut; and in the case of the Brown
property, such a vehicle must go forward and cannot back out
without going beyond plaintiff's property.
K&

11.

None of the routes of access to parking available

to plaintiffs and their customers before the curbs were put
in by the defendant is now available.
^

12.

The loss of parking spaces resulting from the

building of the curb has damaged the businesses conducted on
the premises and has reduced the value of the properties to
a substantial extent.
+jb

13.

The curb cuts placed for access to the properties

of plaintiffs have approximately four-inch (4") verticle face,
whereas the curb cuts to all other properties on the 13 00 South
Street project have a rounding face of approximately one-inch
(1") height, making use of said curb cuts unpleasant and difficult.
Q\t

14.

The resultant conditions of the proper-tries of

the plaintiffs are that water from th^ir properties and from
the gutter in front of the other properties now washes on to
the front Q £ ffhe property of plaintiffs and accumulates there
without draining, -and there is a sidewalk in front of all the
other properties on 1300 South Street except in front of the

C00129
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properties of plaintiffs, as shown on the photographs in evidence.
0 ^ 15.

Lorin Miller is the Lessee of Three D Corporation

and claims damage to his leasehold interest because of the loss
of parking involved in this action.
16.

Said roadway widening eliminated the continued

use of plaintiffs1 property as a parking area adjacent to the
front of plaintiffs' properties.

However, two curb cuts were

constructed so as to provide access to the subject properties
from the roadway.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

No private citizen has any particular right to

use a particular part of the roadway to get on his property
in any particular way, to have the use of his property in any
particular fashion, to have parking in one part of it, or to
drive in in another part of it.
2.

The installation of the high back curb in front

of plaintiffs1 property on 1300 South did not restrict the access
to plaintiffs1 property so unreasonably as to make it a taking
within the meaning of Utah law.
3.

Although plaintiffs suffered considerable damage

by the loss of their available parking, they did have access
to their property from the public roadway.
4.

The ordinances cited by the defendant, specifically

Chapter 9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,

Q00140
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1955, and Section 6-1-43f Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah, 1944, do not apply.
5.

The action by the defendant in installing a high

back curb in front of plaintiffs1 property constitutes a valid
exercise of the police power of the municipality and therefore
no right of action exists against the municipality.
6.

Plaintiffs have failed to show a taking, and

in the absence of any taking, the plaintiffs cannot recover.
DATED this

day of December, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
Approved as to Form;

Arthur L. Keesler, Jr.
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were served on the defendant this

/f

day

of December, 19 85, by -wailing a true and correct copy thereof
j^rdi—UniLed—States—Mai4—with

pootagc prepaid—thorson to Arthur

E. Keesler, Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 100 Cit}
and County Building, Salt Lake .City, Utah 84111, attorney foi
defendant.

—^WACA/
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ARTHUR L. KEESLER, JR. , #1781
A s s i s t a n t City Attorney
Attorney f o r Defendant
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
Telephone:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THREE -D CORPORATION, a
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , DISTRIBUTORS
INC. , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,
LORIN S.. MILLER, d / b / a WESTERN
BATTERY MANUFACTURING,
Plaintiffs,
vs •

)
)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
C i v i l No. C84-3228
Judge S c o t t D a n i e l s

/

SALT LAKE CITY, a m u n i c i p a l
corpo r a t i o n ,
Defendant*

)
)
)

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on f o r t r i a l
Judicial

District

Court of t h e S t a t e of U t a h , t h e Honorable

D a n i e l s p r e s i d i n g , on t h e 2 7 t h day of November,
was t h e n c o n t i n u e d t o t h e 2nd day of December,
further continued

b e f o r e the Third

t o t h e 4 t h day of December,

were r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l Richard B i r d ,

1985.

198 5, and
1985.

Plainiffs

trial

then

Plaintiffs

J r . , and t h e

was r e p r e s e n t e d by Arthur L. K e e s l e r , J r . , A s s i s t a n t
Attorney.

The

Scott

defendant

City

were a l l o w e d t o amend t h e i r Complaint by
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including Ted R. Brown and Warren B. Brown, Trustee, as owners of
the property at 234 West 1300 South and Distributors Inc., a
Colorado corporation, as parties plaintiff*

The Court, after

reviewing the evidence, including the testimony of all of the
witnesses, and the arguments of counsel, hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Three-D Corporation is the owner of real property

located at 238 West 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
2.

Warren B. Brown, Trustee, and Ted R. Brown are now the

owners of real property located at 234 West 1300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, which property is under lease to Distributors Inc.
Colorado and Distributors Inc. Utah.
3.

On June 1, 1983, defendant commenced the construction of

a Special Improvement District which provided for the installation of curb and gutter and the widening of the roadway of 1300
South Street.
4.

In order to widen the boundaries of 1300 South Street

between 200 and 300 West Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah, the
defendant attempted to purchase a portion of plaintiffs1 property
which fronted on said said street.
5.

The plaintiffs refused to sell any portion of their

frontage property for the street widening project unless they
were paid for damage to their property from loss of parking
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spaces.

As a r e s u l t , the City extended the roadway, widening

only to the e x i s t i n g boundaries of 1300 South S t r e e t and no
p o r t i o n of the roadway or curb was constructed upon property
owned by the defendants.

Two curb cuts were made allowing

p l a i n t i f f s continued access to t h e i r p r o p e r t y .
6.

The b u i l d i n g of each p l a i n t i f f

was constructed with

o f f i c e s and a r e a s for serving drop-in customers with s a l e s and
s e r v i c e s , which b u i l d i n g s were so used from 1956 as to the Three
D building and from 1957 as to the D i s t r i b u t o r s I n c . b u i l d i n g .
7.

The placing of the curb a t the property l i n e s of the

p l a i n t i f f s has prevented p l a i n t i f f s and t h e i r customers from
driving from 1300 South S t r e e t d i r e c t l y i n t o each of t h e i r angle
parking s p a c e s .
8.

Lorin M i l l e r i s the Lessee of Three D Corporation and

claims damage to h i s leasehold i n t e r e s t because of the l o s s of
parking involved in t h i s a c t i o n .
9.

Said roadway widening e l i m i n a t e d

t h e c o n t i n u e d u s e of

plaintiffs'

property as a parking

area adjacent

to the front

plaintiffs'

properties.

two c u r b c u t s

were

However/

so as to p r o v i d e a c c e s s to the s u b j e c t

properties

of

constructed

form

the

roadway.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

No p r i v a t e c i t i z e n h a s any p a r t i c u l a r

particular

p a r t of

right

to use a

t h e r o a d w a y t o g e t on h i s p r o p e r t y i n a n y
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particular way, to have the use of his property in any particular
fashion, to have parking in one part of it, or to drive in in
another part of it.
2.

The installation of the high back curb in front of

plaintiffs' property on 1300 South did not restrict the access to
plaintiffs1 property so unreasonably as to make it a taking
within the meaning of Utah law.
3.

Although plaintiffs suffered considerable damage by the

loss of their available parking, they did have access to their
property from the public roadway.
4.

The ordinances cited by the defendant, specifically

Chapter 9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1955, and Section 6-1-43, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah, 1944, do not apply.
5.

The action by the defendant in installing a high back

curb in front of plaintiffs1 property constitutes a valid
exercise of the police power of the municipality and therefore no
right of action exists against the municipality.
6.

Plaintiffs have failed to show a taking, and in the

absence of any taking, the plaintiffs cannot recover.
DATED this

^jQ) day of January, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS

ATTEST
_4 _
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^tr.Approved

as to Form;

RicHard L. Bird, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintifts

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Richard L. Bird, Jr.,
Attorney for Plaintiffs, at 333 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage
prepaid thereon, this

*?/$T

day of January, 1986.
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JAN
R i c h a r d L . B i r d , J r . (#0338)
David J . B i r d (#0334)
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
333 E a s t F o u r t h S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
84111
Telephone:
(801) 3 2 8 - 8 9 8 7
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING,

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Civil No. C84-3228
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiffs move for a new trial in this action for reasons of
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision and that
the decision is contrary to law, both in granting the motion
to dismiss and in failing to make the Findings of Fact as requested
by the plaintiffs.
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DATED this J^(~

day of January, 1986.
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP

Richard L. Bird, (jj*f.
By

/)+S/£~
DaVid J .

Bird
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
was served on the defendant this

2 7

day of January, 1986,

by mailing a true and correct copy thereof via United States
Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler, Jr.,
Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 100 City and County Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for defendant.
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FILMED

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utali

DEC 3 1986
Richard L. Bird, Jr. (#0338)
David J. Bird (#0334)
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8987

n

D&putv G.erk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Civil No. C84-3228
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

Defendant.
The Motion of plaintiffs for a new trial made and
filed on January 27, 1986, having been submitted on a Memorandum
supporting the position of plaintiffs, and the Court having
had the matter under advisement and having considered the Motion
and the Memorandum submitted by the plaintiffs;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for New Trial
be and hereby is denied.
DATED this

~S

day of November, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DiXON HlNULEY
/
cw*n

urn

SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL was served on the defendant this

5 *-*> day of

Nuvuiuber, 1986, by mailing a true and correct copy thereof via
United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler,
Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 125 Circuit Court Building,
425 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for
defendant.
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67
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF ADDENDUM
I hereby certify the foregoing ADDENDUM to Brief of
Appellants was served on the respondent this 20th day of March,
1987, by mailing four

(4) true and correct copies thereof via

United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler,
Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 125 Circuit Court Building,
425 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
respondent.

84111, attorney for

